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Abstract
To remove key escrow problem and avoid the need of secure channel in ID based cryptosystem
Lee et al.[1] proposed a secure key issuing protocol. However we show that it suffers from imper-
sonation, insider attacks and incompetency of the key privacy authorities. We also cryptanalyze
Sui et al.’s[2] separable and anonymous key issuing protocol.
1 Review of Lee et al.’s Protocol [1]
It includes five stages namely, System Setup, System Public Key Setup, Key Issuing, Key Securing
and Key Retrieving.
1.1 System Setup
The KGC specifies two cyclic groups G1, G2 of prime order q where G1 is additive and G2 is multi-
plicative groups. It also defines a bilinear mapping as e : G1 × G1 → G2 between G1, G2 and hash
functions H : {0, 1}∗ → G1, h : G2 → Z
∗
q . Let P ∈ G1 be an arbitrary generator of G1. The KGC
selects a master key s0 ∈ Z
∗
q at random and computes its pubic key P0 = s0P .
1.2 System Public Key Setup
The n KPAs establish their key pairs. KPAi chooses his master key si and computes his public
key Pi = siP ,∀i = 1, ..., n. Then all KPAs cooperate sequentially and computes Y
′
i=siYi−1 where
Y ′
0
= P0 = s0P .
Finally, Y = Y ′n = s0s1...snP is published as system public key. This sequential process can be
verified by e(Y ′i , P ) = e(Y
′
i−1, Pi).
1.3 Key Issuing
A user with ID chooses a random secret x, computes a blinding factor X = xP and requests the
KGC to issue a partial private key by sending X , ID. Then the KGC issues a blinded partial private
key as follows.
1. Checks the identification and computes the public key of the user as
QID = H(ID,KGC,KPA1, ...,KPAn).
2. Computes a blinded partial private key as Q′
0
= h(e(s0X,P0))s0QID.
1
3. Computes KGC’s signature on Q′
0
as Sig0(Q
′
0
) = s0Q
′
0
.
4. Sends Q′
0
and Sig0(Q
′
0
) to the user.
The user can unblind Q′
0
using his knowledge of x, since
h(e(s0X,P0))=h(e(s0xP, P0)) = h(e(P0, P0)
x).
1.4 Key Securing
The user requests KPAi(i = 1, ..., n) sequentially to provide key privacy service by sending ID, X ,
Q′i−1 and Sigi−1(Q
′
i−1). Then KPAi performs following steps
1. Checks e(Sigi−1(Q
′
i−1), P ) = e(Q
′
i−1, Pi−1).
2. Computes Q′i = h(e(siX,Pi))siQ
′
i−1 and Sigi(Q
′
i = siQ
′
i).
3. Sends Q′i and Sigi(Q
′
i) to the user.
This process is carried out up to KPAn. Finally user receives Q
′
n.
1.5 Key Retrieving
The user retrieves his private key SID by unblinding Q
′
n as follows.
SID =
Q′n
h(e(P0, P0)x)h(e(P1, P1)x)...h(e(Pn, Pn)x)
= s0s1...snQID
The user can verify the correctness of his private key by e(SID, P ) = e(QID, Y ).
2 Cryptanalysis of Lee et al.’s Protocol
2.1 Impersonation Attack
In Key Issuing phase, user sends X = xP and ID to the KGC. Any active adversary can modify the
X as X∗ = x∗P and still it cannot be detected by KGC. Because there is no binding between the ID
and X . Then KGC computes partial private key Q∗
0
= h(e(s0X
∗, P0))s0QID, and sends to the user
through public channel. Adversary can eavesdrop Q∗
0
and request the KPAs for key privacy service.
At the end Adversary can extract the private key by unblinding Q∗n.
2.2 Insider Attack
In Key Securing phase, user requests KPAi to provide key privacy service by sending ID, X , Q
′
i−1,
Sigi−1(Q
′
i−1), where fourth parameter is a signature of KPAi−1 on third parameter.
If KPAi−1 wants a signature of KPAi on m, he sends ID
∗, X∗ = x∗P , Q∗i−1 = rH(m) and
Sigi−1(Q
∗
i−1) = rsi−1H(m) to KPAi where r ∈R Z
∗
q . Then KPAi performs the following steps
1. Checks e(Sigi−1(Q
∗
i−1), P ) = e(Q
∗
i−1, Pi−1).
2. Computes Q∗i = h(e(siX
∗, Pi))siQ
∗
i−1 and Sigi(Q
∗
i ) = siQ
∗
i .
3. Sends Q∗i and Sigi(Q
∗
i ) to the user(i.e. KPAi−1).
Now, KPAi−1 has Q
∗
i = h(e(siX
∗, Pi))sirH(m) and he can extract the signature of KPAi on m
as h(e(Pi, Pi)
x∗)−1r−1Q∗i = siH(m). At the same time KPAi cannot get signature of the KPAi−1
(i.e. si−1H(m)), because KPAi−1 sends his signature in blinded manner. Thus, KPAi−1 can obtain
KPAi’s signature on any message of his choice.
2
2.3 Incompetency of KPAs
In Key Securing Phase, the user requests KPAi(i = 1, 2, ..., n) sequentially to provide key privacy
service by sending ID, X , Q′i−1, and Sigi−1(Q
′
i−1). Then KPAi validates the received parameters
by checking the equality
e(Sigi−1(Q
′
i−1), P )=e(Q
′
i−1, Pi−1).
Any active adversary can alter Q′i−1, Sigi−1(Q
′
i−1) and replaces with the following Q
∗
i−1 = r
∗Q′i−1,
Sigi−1(Q
∗
i−1) = r
∗Sigi−1(Q
′
i−1). Then KPAi performs
1. Checks e(Sigi−1(Q
∗
i−1), P ) = e(Q
∗
i−1, Pi−1)
2. Computes Q∗i = h(e(siX,Pi))siQ
′
i−1 and Sigi(Q
∗
i ) = siQ
∗
i
3. Sends Q∗i , and Sigi(Q
∗
i ) to the user.
It may be noted that the user is not checking the correctness of the received parameters in inter-
mediate stages. Therefore any modification by an Adversary during the communication between user
and KPAi will be undetected till the end of Key Securing Phase. This requires the user to execute
this phase again from the beginning. Further, as the KGC and KPAs are not capable of checking the
validity of the received parameters, they are signing them blindly.
The attack given in Section 2.1 can also be applied to [3].
3 Review of Sui et al. [2]
A one time password pwd can be established between the Local Registration Authority(LRA) and
the user after the off-line authentication.
Setup(run by KGC): It takes the security parameter k and returns params (System Parameters)
and the master-key. Let G be a GDH group of prime order p. Public information is ISAKI =
(G, p,H, PPKG). P is a generator of G andH : 0, 1
∗ → G is a oneway hash function and QA = H(idA).
PPKG = sP is the system public key.
Key Generation: It takes inputs as params, master-key, and an arbitrary ID ∈ {0, 1}∗; and returns
a private key SID. The password pwd is user’s chosen password during off-line authentication and
the tuple (ID, pwd) is stored in KGC’s database of “pending private key”.
1. A:selects a random number r, A→ KGC : Q = rH(ID), T = r−1H(pwd).
2. KGC: checks the validity of the request by checking whether e(Q, T ) = e(H(ID), H(pwd)) holds
for a certain tuple in KGC’s database.
3. KGC: computes sQ, KGC → A : S = sQ
4. A: verifies the blinded private key by checking e(S, P ) = e(Q,PPKG). If it holds, A unblinds
the encrypted private key and obtains sH(ID).
The user can delete pwd after obtaining the private key. The KGC can also remove the tuple (ID, pwd)
from the database after the protocol.
4 Cryptanalysis of Sui et al. Protocol
4.1 Stolen Verifier Attack
In Sui et al. protocol, (ID, password) is stored in KGC’s database. If an Adversary steals the
database he can have genuine users’ secrets on requesting the KGC on behalf of any registered user
available in database. Though the KGC stores (ID, password) for a short-time till the corresponding
secret key is issued, it affects the protocol entirely.
3
4.2 Insider Attack
In practice, it is likely that a user uses same password to access several systems and other purposes
for his convenience. In the registration phase, the user gives his password pwd to LRA and the LRA
stores the ID and corresponding password in the database. In the extended scheme given to remove
the key escrow by single KGC, the database is accessible by multiple KGC’s and LRA. Any one of
the insider of the system could impersonate user’s login on stealing password and can get access of
the other systems.
4.3 Incompetency of KGCs
A user requests for private key as follows:
• Selects a random number r, and computes Q = rH(ID), T = r−1H(password) and sends to
the KGC.
• KGC checks the validity of the request by checking the equality
e(Q, T ) = e(H(ID), H(password)).
• Computes blinded private key S = sQ and sends to the user where s is the KGC’s private key.
• Then user verifies S by checking the equality e(S, P ) = e(Q,Ppub) where Ppub = sP is KGC’s
public key.
Any Adversary can alter the parameters Q, T and replace with Q∗ = r∗Q, T ∗ = r∗
−1
T and KGC
verifies the equality e(Q∗, T ∗) = e(H(ID), H(password)). Then the KGC computes S∗ = sQ∗ and
sends to the user. In this protocol the KGC cannot check the validity of the parameters received and
thus blindly signs on it.
5 Conclusion
In this work we have cryptanalyzed two ID based key issuing protocols of [1, 2]. We showed that the
Lee et al. [1] protocol suffers from impersonation, insider attacks and incompetency of the key privacy
authorities. We also showed that the Sui et al.’s[2] separable and anonymous key issuing protocol
suffers from stolen verifier, insider attacks and incompetency of key generation centers.
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